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REDUCING THE SIZE OF JURIES
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years court dockets have become increasingly con-
gested. The resulting delays1 place a great burden both on civil
litigants 2 and on the criminally accused who often await trial for
more than two years. 3 In responding to this problem, jurists have
focused on trial by jury and have typically suggested modi-
fications of two types: either limiting access to juries by litigants,
or increasing the efficiency of the juries themselves. 4 Some critics
have even contended that the anachronistic procedure of jury
trials is such an undue burden on the judicial system that it should
be abolished in the interest of efficient dispensation of justice.5
Most attempts at modification have been directed toward
streamlining the jury process rather than further restricting the
litigant's opportunity for a jury trial. 6 In this effort, several states
have established provisions for reducing the number of jurors
impaneled. 7 The purpose of this article will be to analyze the
effects of these reductions on the judicial system and to ascertain
the potential impact on the process of reaching a verdict.
1For example, the criminal case backlog has more than doubled in the last decade.
Report of the Administrative Office of the Federal Courts, discussed in Graham, Some
Problems in the Safeguards for Defendants, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1969, § 4, at 8, col. I. •
2 Id. In New York the backlog was so great in 1969 that the chief judge of the federal
district court assigned twelve of the city's fifteen district judges exclusively to the task of
trying first degree murder cases and armed robbery cases. Thus, only three judges were
available to hear civil cases.
3 N.Y. Times, April 28, 1968, at 48, col. 1. Former Chief Justice Warren commented:
For those who are unable to secure their release on bail pending trial, the
delay is intolerable. But, even for those who do secure their release pending
trial, the delay means that a criminal charge hangs like a cloud over a man for
two years without any judicial determination of guilt or innocence.
4 See Comment, Abolition of the Civil Jury: Proposed Alternatives, 15 DEPAUL L. REV.
416 (1966). The author suggests limiting jury trials to cases involving five thousand dollars
or more. See also Lousberg, On Keeping the Civil Jury Trial, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 344
(1968), where the author suggests restricting access to a jury to those litigants who have
completed an elaborate pre-trial process.
5 Comment, A bolition of the Civil Jury: Proposed Alternatives, supra note 4.
6 See generally Joiner, Jury Trials-Improved Procedures, 48 F.R.D. 79 (1969), where
Dean Joiner suggests the streamlining of trials through, among other things, the use of
contingent fees, confession of judgment, audio-visual recordings, special verdicts, new
evidentiary rules, mediation, partial summary judgments, consolidation of motion hearings,
and insurance limits.
7 See, e.g., MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1352 (1970). "in a civil case.., trial shall
be by jury of 6.... [A] verdict shall be received when 5 jurors agree." CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 78-7-4 (1963), at note 116 infra; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.44.120 (1956), at
note 116 infra; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-243 (1960).
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
OF THE TWELVE MAN JURY
In Thompson v. Utah8 the Supreme Court first stated that a
person accused of a felony was entitled to a trial by jury of twelve
members.9 In discussing Utah's provision for an eight man jury,
the Court concluded that the sixth amendment mandated a com-
mon law jury "of twelve persons, neither more nor less." 10 The
Court's only inquiry into the merits of the reduced jury was the
observation that:
[i]f... it was competent for the State to prescribe a jury of
eight persons, it could just as well have prescribed a jury of
four or two, and, perhaps, have dispensed altogether with a
jury, and provided for a trial before a single judge."'
Apparently, the Court's insistence on a common law jury of
twelve was founded upon the strength of historical precedent and
fear of systematic erosion of the basic right to jury trial. The
concern regarding possible loss of this basic right was further
evidenced by the Court's refusal to permit any voluntary waiver
of the constitutional right to trial by jury. 12
One year later, in Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,13 the Court
8 170 U.S. 343 (1898). The Court determined that Utah's state constitutional provision
for trial by a jury composed of eight members in certain criminal cases was ex post facto in
its application to a felony committed before the territory became a state. The court noted
that the provisions of the Bill of Rights relating to the right of trial by jury in suits at
common law applied to territories of the United States. Since the statutes of the territory
in force at the time the crime was committed provided for a twelve man jury, the holdings
relating to the constitutionality of small juries may have been unnecessary.
9 Id.
10 id. at 349-50. The Court, tracing the genesis of the constitutional reference to jury
trials to the common law of England, placed primary emphasis on the Magna Carta
guarantee of a twelve man jury:
[T]he word "jury" and the words "trial by jury" were placed in the Con-
stitution of the United States with reference to the meaning affixed to them in
the law as it was in this country and in England at the time of that in-
strument....
170 U.S. at 350.
The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .. " U.S. CONST. amend.
V1.
11 170 U.S. at 353.12 1d. at 354- 55. The seventh amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
13 174 U.S. 1 (1899). Capital Traction petitioned the supreme court of the District of
Columbia for a writ of certiorari to remove a civil action being heard by a justice of the
peace who had impanelled a twelve man jury to hear the case. The petition was granted by
the supreme court of the District, but quashed by the D.C. Court of Appeals and
petitioner sought to have it reinstated, claiming that the contemplated trial by jury was not
within the meaning of the seventh amendment.
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ruled that trial by jury in a civil action similarly required twelve
men, the Court failing to distinguish between civil and criminal
cases. In reaching the decision, the Supreme Court relied upon
what it deemed to be the framers' intention to incorporate into the
seventh amendment "the rules of the common law of England,
and not the rules of that law as modified by local statute or usage
in any of the States."' 4 Since the common law of England envi-
sioned a trial by twelve members, the District of Columbia was
bound to provide a twelve man jury. 15
The jury trial issues in both Thompson and Capital Traction
arose in a federal court; thus, the question whether a state court
was bound by the twelve man jury rule was left largely unresolved
until Maxwell v. Dow,16 which presented a challenge to Utah's
constitutional provision for trial by a jury of eight members. The
Supreme Court ruled that the fourteenth amendment did not make
the sixth amendment binding on the states; 17 thus each state could
determine the numerical composition of the jury, so long as the
standard was not discriminatorily applied to different defendants.
Nevertheless, the Court reiterated that a jury of less than twelve
would violate the sixth amendment in a federal case:
That a jury composed, as at common law, of twelve jurors
was intended by the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution, there can be no doubt .. .. And as the right of trial
by jury in certain suits at common law is preserved by the
Seventh Amendment, such a trial implies that there shall be
an unanimous verdict of twelve jurors in all Federal courts
when a jury trial is held.' 8
This position was reaffirmed in Patton v. United States,'9
14 Id. at 8.
15 There is some doubt as to whether the Court needed to make the assertion in
formulating the decision. The petition for a writ of certiorari alleged only that the defen-
dant was to be tried by a jury of twelve men before a justice of the peace, and that the
latter aspect was unconstitutional. No allegations were made regarding the size of the jury.
Id. at 3-4.
16 176 U.S. 581 (1900). Petitioner had been convicted of robbery in the state of Utah by
a jury composed of eight members as provided by the state constitution. He appealed to
the Supreme Court on the grounds that his privileges and immunities as a citizen of the
United States had been violated and he had been denied due process of law in con-
travention of the fourteenth amendment.
" 17The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has now been interpreted to
apply most aspects of the sixth amendment to the states: right to counsel, Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); right to a speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213 (1967); right to a public trial, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); right to confront
opposing witnesses, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); right to compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); and right to trial by jury
(for all but petty crimes), Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
18 176 U.S. at 586.
19281 U.S. 276 (1930). The defendant had been tried and convicted of a criminal
offense by a panel of eleven jurors in a federal court. The twelfth juror had become ill, and
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where the Court enumerated the essential elements of jury trial
"as they were recognized in this country and England when the
Constitution was adopted": 20
(1) that the jury should consist of twelve men, neither more
nor less;
(2) that the trial should be in the presence and under the
superintendence of a judge having power to instruct them as
to the law and advise them in respect of the facts; and
(3) that the verdict should be unanimous. 2'
The Court concluded that any deviation from these prerequisites
in federal courts would be unconstitutional. 22 Although the Court
acknowledged the need to modify some common law aspects of
jury trial23 in view of changed conditions,2 4 the justification for the
three enumerated requirements continued to exist.2 Thus, im-
plicit in the Court's reliance on a continuing justification under-
lying the vitality of the "essential" twelve man jury is the proposi-
tion that it, too, could be abandoned upon proof that the purpose
it served at common law no longer existed. 26
Until 1968, the Court consistently ruled that the jury provisions
of the sixth and seventh amendments applied only to the federal
courts, while state courts were not constitutionally bound to the
guarantee of trial by jury.27 Indeed, states were free to abolish
the trial continued only after the defendant personally consented in open court. The Court,
therefore, deemed waiver of any of the essential elements of jury trial (specifically jury of
twelve members) equivalent to a waiver of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the sixth
amendment. The main issue of the case was whether waiver of this right was permissible.20 Id. at 288.
21 Id.
22 "A constitutional jury means twelve men as though that number had been specifically
named; and it follows that when reduced to eleven it ceases to be such a jury quite as
effectively as though the number had been reduced to a single person." Id. at 292.
23 Among the common law restraints which had been modified were: (1) the common
law denial of waiver of trial by jury in criminal actions; (2) the prohibition aginst an
accused testifying in his own behalf; (3) the denial of counsel in felony cases; and (4) the
attaint and forfeiture of official titles of inheritance upon conviction of a crime. "These
conditions have ceased to exist, and with their disappearance justification for the old rule
no longer rests upon a substantial basis." Id. at 307.
24The Court quoted with approval the Supreme Court of Nevada in Reno Smelting
Works v. Stevenson, 20 Nev. 269, 279 (1889): "It is contrary to the spirit of the common
law itself to apply a rule founded on a particular reason to a law when that reason utterly
fails-cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex." Id. at 306.
25 The criterion used to determine when a common law standard is no longer justified
remains nebulous. The Court cited with approval Hack v. State, 141 Wis. 346, (1910), in
which it was suggested that the increased procedural safeguards in modern criminal trials
made some of the strict common law standards unnecessary to assure protection to the
accused. Id. 307-08.
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), in which petitioner's conviction by
a state "blue ribbon" jury was upheld. The Court stated that "the commandments of the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments... are not picked up by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth so as to become limitations on the states." id. at 288.
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completely trial by jury if such action would not run afoul of state
constitutional provisions. 28 The Court could thereby consistently
demand strict adherence to the common law standard of the
twelve man jury in federal courts, while permitting state courts
significantly greater flexibility.
In Duncan v. Louisiana29 the Court distinguished between
sixth and seventh amendment jury trial guarantees and declared
that the due process clause imposed sixth amendment standards
on the states. Appellant, convicted of a misdemeanor, had been
denied a jury trial pursuant to a provision of the Louisiana Con-
stitution allowing trial by jury only in cases where capital punish-
ment or imprisonment at hard labor could be imposed. Mr. Justice
White, speaking for the Court, stated:
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is
fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in
all criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a federal
court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's guaran-
tee.3 o
With the sixth amendment applicable to the states, it seemed
likely that the decisions interpreting the essentials of jury com-
position would apply equally to state and federal courts in crimi-
nal cases.
In the recent landmark case of Williams v. Florida,3 1 the Su-
preme Court held, however, that Florida's six member jury did
not violate the sixth amendment as applied to the states by the
fourteenth, and thereby eliminated the twelve man jury require-
ment for criminal cases.32 In its opinion the Court reexamined the
intent of the founding fathers and concluded, after conceding the
elusiveness of any inquiry into the framers' intent, that the draft-
ers had not meant to incorporate the twelve man requirement into
the Constitution. 33
28 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). Petitioner, who had been sentenced for
murder, claimed that a Massachusetts statute which permitted the jury to view the scene of
the crime without the defendant being present, constituted a denial of due process under
the fourteenth amendment. The court upheld the statute stating at 105 that the state's
procedure "does not run foul [sic] of the Fourteenth Amendment because another method
may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser .... Consistently with that amendment, trial
by jury may be abolished." (emphasis added).
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
3 0 1d. at 149. The status of seventh amendment juries was left open by Duncan, and
there have been no indications that states would be required to adhere to the federal
standard established in Capital Traction. See text accompanying notes 13 through 15
supra.
31 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
32 See generally Comment, Florida's Six-Member Criminal Juries: Constitutional, But
Are They Fair?, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 402 (1971).
33 399 U.S. at 99. This conclusion was based on the contrasting versions of the sixth
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Having concluded that a jury of less than twelve would violate
neither the letter nor the intent of the Constitution,34 the Court
considered whether the social and judicial functions of a jury
could be served equally well by a jury of six. First, the Court
investigated the origin of the twelve man jury in an attempt to
determine whether the number was originally justified by any
social or judicial logic.35 Although several possible explanations
were uncovered, 36 nothing indicated that the number twelve was
reached as a result of anything other than historical accident.
Addressing itself to the jury's function and the possible con-
sequences of altering its size, the Court determined the essential
features of jury trial to be interposition between the accused and
the accusor, the common sense judgment of a group of laymen,
community participation, the deliberative process of decision-
making, freedom from outside intimidation, and the use of a
representative cross section of the community to determine
guilt.37 In this context, the Supreme Court concluded that modi-
fication of the jury system through reduction in the number of
jurors would not significantly affect the purposes to be served:
[W]e find little reason to think that these goals are in any
meaningful sense less likely to be achieved when the jury
numbers six, than when it numbers 12-particularly if the
requirement of unanimity is retained. And, certainly the relia-
amendment as passed in the House and as finally approved by the Senate. While the
House version made specific references to provisions of the common law jury-specifically
a vicinage requirement-the Senate rejected these allusions, preferring not to freeze the
traditional common law requirements into the Constitution. The Court in making this
inquiry, underscored three factors: (I) the article IIl reference to trial by jury was not
intended to include the common law requirements, (2) the original House provisions,
which would have tied the common law requirements to jury trial, were intentionally
deleted, and (3) other legislative documents demonstrated that the founding fathers could
have been more specific had they so desired.
In a footnote the Court pointed out that the particular relevance of the third factor was
that the states had already adopted various modifications of common law jury trials
including less than unanimous verdicts and juries of six and seven. This suggests that the
founding fathers were aware of the probable results of not incorporating specifics into the
amendment. Id., n.45 at 98-99.
34 Id. at 99.
35 Id. at 100. This inquiry has often been made by jurists proposing a modification of the
size of juries and is based on the argument that if a characteristic is not logically related to
the function of the jury, then it may be modified without detriment to the system. See
Tamm, The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 51 GEO. L.J.
120 (1962); Comment, Right to Trial by Jury: Is it Necessary? 15 DEPAUL L. REV. 398
(1966); Wiehl, The Six Man Jury, 4GONZAGA L. REV. 35, 39 (1968).
36 In reviewing the literature, the Court uncovered many possible explanations for the
number twelve-twelve tribes of Israel, twelve patriarchs, twelve apostles and twelve
stones. 399 U.S. at 88. On the other hand history tells of jury-like institutions of 500, 100,
66, 41, 20, 17, 11, 8, 7, and other numbers. Tamm, supra note 35, at 128. See also Wiehl,
supra note 35, n.14 at 39, where it is suggested that the number twelve was a favorite
number of judicial bodies in various Teutonic nations.
37 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
[VOL. 5 :1
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bility of the jury as a factfinder hardly seems likely to be a
function of its size.38
The Court noted that only one characteristic of a six man jury
might change the outcome in certain cases:3 9 there might be fewer
"hung" juries where only six instead of twelve jurors must reach
unanimous agreement. 40
It is true, of course, that the 'hung jury' might be thought to
result in a minimal advantage for the defendant, who remains
unconvicted and who enjoys the prospect that the prose-
cution will eventually be dropped if subsequent juries also
'hang.' Thus a 100-man jury would undoubtedly be more
favorable for defendants than a 12-man jury. But when the
comparison is between 12 and six, the odds of continually
'hanging' the jury, seem slight, and the numerical difference in
the number needed to convict seems unlikely to inure per-
ceptibly to the advantage of either side. 41
The question of constitutionality of reduced jury size for civil
cases in federal and state courts was not specifically before the
Court and consequently was left unresolved. In federal civil cases
the seventh amendment requirement of a twelve man jury has not
been relaxed. 42 Nevertheless, to date, the Supreme Court has
never ruled that the seventh amendment is applicable to the
states. Thus it could be argued that the states are free to utilize
less than a twelve man jury in civil cases. Although the Court in
Williams did not discuss the constitutional necessity of the twelve
man civil jury, its reasons justifying a reduced criminal jury com-
pel the conclusion that a smaller civil jury would be equally
acceptable. Moreover, the argument for a full-sized jury in crimi-
nal trials seems stronger than that for civil trials, for the sanctions
imposed on those found guilty are greater.43 The jury in a criminal
38 Id. at 100- 0 1.
39 One commentator has taken issue with the Court's reasoning on this point and has
shown through the use of a mathematical probability model that the likelihood of con-
viction may change somewhat when the number of jurors is reduced from twelve to six.
Note, The Effect of Jury Size on the Probability of Conviction: An Evaluation of Williams
v. Florida, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 529 (1971). Specifically, the author shows that for a
specific percentage of potential jurors who are "guilty-prone," the probability of conviction
varies somewhat depending upon the number of jurors deliberating. This theoretical model,
of course, does not take into consideration any of the variety of parameters resulting from
the change in the small group structure. Thus, the theory ignores changes in group
cohesion, group satisfaction and number of communications which occur as a result of the
reduction, and relies totally upon the premise that once a majority is formed, the verdict
usually coincides with their opinion. See text accompanying note 93 infra.
40 399 U.S. at 101.
41 Id., n.47. Note that Justice White's analysis was not documented and the statistical
differences are open to refutation.
4Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. I (1899).
43J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 136 (1963). Such sanctions include the stigma of
FALL 197 1 ]
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trial, therefore, should arguably maintain the strict features of the
common law jury to provide greater protection for the accused,
while the consequences of a smaller jury for civil cases would be
of relatively less importance. Since the Williams Court permitted
reduced juries in criminal actions, it follows that reduced juries
should also be constitutionally permissible in civil cases."4
III. THE TWELVE MAN JURY SYSTEM
A. Criticism of the Jury System
as Presently Constituted
The principal criticisms of the jury system as presently con-
stituted are primarily directed against the incompetence of jurors
and the inefficiency inherent in the process.' 5 Critics point out
that a jury lacks expertise in interpretation of the law and is
therefore more likely to become confused than would a skilled
jurist trying the same case. 46 They further contend that an un-
skilled juror is more likely to be unduly influenced by the forensic
techniques of trial lawyers, thereby incurring the possibility that
jury decisions reflect an emotional reaction to the lawyer rather
than a rational conviction based on the facts of the case.4 7 These
criticisms are somewhat tempered by the deliberative methods of
the jury system whereby the jury utilizes the process of contribu-
tion and analysis by the various members in reaching decisions.48
Moreover, judges, who lack the benefit of discussion with fellow
criminal penalty, the higher standard-of proof required in criminal trials and the more
onerous penalties imposed by the criminal law.
44 The argument against the constitutionality of the smaller jury in civil cases is that the
seventh amendment makes certain additional references to the common law which are not
included in the sixth. The sixth amendment makes no reference at all to common law
juries, whereas the seventh explicitly states that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law." This reference to the common law might be interpreted as an indication by the
founding fathers that the common law jury requirements should be maintained in civil
actions but not in criminal cases. However, since the Court in Williams noted that most of
the social policy relating to the function of the jury in criminal cases also applies to civil
cases, it may be reasonably concluded that the Court would be willing to accept juries of
less than twelve in civil cases. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, n.30 at 92 (1970):
"[W]e do not decide whether, for example, additional references to the 'common law'
which occur in the Seventh Amendment might support a different interpretation."
4See, e.g., Comment, The Case for Retention of the Unanimous Civil Jury, 15
DEPAUL L. REV. 403, 407 (1966); Lousberg, supra note 4.
-4 Lousberg, supra note 4, at 345; Abolition of the Civil Jury: Proposed Alternatives,
supra note 4, at 419-21.
47 Comment, The Case for the Retention of the Unanimous Civil Jury, supra note 45, at
409; Comment,A bolition of the Civil Jury: Proposed Alternatives, supra note 4, at 419.
4",The give-and-take of group deliberation screens out errors, negates biases, and
eliminates erroneous hypotheses to a far greater extent than individual deliberation." C.
JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 26 (1962).
[VOL. 5: 1
FALL 1971] Reducing the Size of Juries
jurors,49 are not immune to the techniques of experienced court-
room lawyers. Criticisms of the jury's lack of expertise in in-
terpretation of fact also seem of only limited validity in light of the
lack of divergence between judge and jury decisions, as indicated
by the Chicago jury study finding that there is judge-jury agree-
ment in 78 percent of the cases.50
The critics' charge of jury inefficiency is more difficult to refute.
Inefficiency results from the length of jury trials and the additional
costs which they incur. The length of jury trials is estimated to be
40 percent longer than cases tried by judge alone.51 This reflects
the time necessary to impanel the jury, conduct the voir dire,
introduce exhibits, allow for entrance and exiting of the jurors,
permit lengthy deliberation, and poll the jury. While a few propos-
als for modification have been suggested and enacted to correct
individual factors of jury delay,52 the inefficiency problem results
from the sum total of time used to conduct the trial. The economic
wastes inherent in the system are attributed primarily to the per
diem and subsistence expenses paid to the jurors,53 but there are
additional costs to society which cannot be reimbursed, such as
losses to the jurors due to absence from employment and losses to
the employer from reduction of his work force. 54 Although some
49 "The judge, as well, could be affected by various trial techniques. Another possibility
is that the judge will subconsciously 'bend over backwards' to avoid such a result. The
judge's decision as to the facts is final, regardless of how it is reached." Comment, The
Case for the Retention of the Unanimous Civil Jury, supra note 45, at 409. While a jury
consisting of a panel of experts on the specific subject matter might be capable of making
the most accurate determination of facts, such a proposal is seldom made as the apparent
disadvantages are excessive costs, the denial of trial by peers, less likelihood of acceptance
by the community and considerable problems of selection of jurors with regard to their
qualifications. Finally, there is no assurance that even experts would not be highly affected
by the dramatic inclinations of the lawyers.
50 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63 (1966). Of the remaining 22
percent in which there was disagreement between judge and jury, juries found for defen-
dant in 12 percent of the cases and for plaintiff in 10 percent. Note that the trials analyzed
in this study were strictly criminal, and it does not purport to speak for civil juries.
51 Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (1964). This figure
is somewhat speculative and is based on a series of judicial estimates. Kalven admits that
cases which are more complex may tend to be channeled toward jurors rather than judges,
so a direct comparison of time involved would be skewed. The only way an accurate figure
could be ascertained would be to have the same cases tried by both a judge and jury.
Estimates have ranged as high as 250 percent longer for trials by jury than for trials by
judge.
52 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10A, § 234 (1968). The trial judge initiates the voir
dire and puts to the jurors any questions which he thinks necessary. The attorneys are
allowed to supplement the examinations but may not examine jurors on matters of law or
the instructions.
5a THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM,
REPORT ON THE JURY SYSTEM IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 26 F.R.D. 409, 487 (1960). In
1960 the entire cost of the federal court system was $45,000,000. Almost one-tenth of that
figure involved jury costs.
14 Littlejohn, The Six-Man Civil Court Jury, 4 TRIAL JUDGES'J. 15 (July 1965).
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states have required litigants to bear a portion of jury costs, 55
there seems to be no way to eliminate all of the social and judicial
costs short of abolishing the jury altogether5 6
B. A Proposal for Jury Reform:
The Reduced Jury
Despite the above problems, the majority of critics concede
that the value of the jury system is too great to warrant its
abolishment. 57 In an attempt to preserve the benefits of the jury
system and, at the same time, minimize the inordinate investment
of time and money which it requires, many jurists have pro-
posed 5a-and many states have legislated- 59 a reduction in the
size of the jury. One of the benefits expected to result from a
decrease in the size of the juries is a corresponding reduction in
the amount of time consumed because of the jury's involvement in
the trial. First, the time required to impanel the jury could reason-
ably be expected to decrease because fewer jurors would need to
be examined. It has been suggested, to the contrary, that with
fewer jurors to choose from, the lawyers will be more critical in
selecting the panel, with the result that the time used to conduct
the voir dire would remain unchanged as the lawyers spent more
time in questioning each potential juror.60 This objection assumes,
however, that lawyers have lower standards of acceptance when
choosing a panel of twelve, and must be more cautious when
selecting a smaller panel. Overriding ethical and pragmatic consid-
erations dictate against this assumption. A lawyer is charged with
the responsibility of exercising utmost care in selection of the
panel regardless of the size, and the degree of caution used does
not generally vary with the number of jurors chosen.61 Thus, it
5 5 THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM,
REPORT ON THE JURY SYSTEM IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 26 F.R.D. 409, 539-40 (1960).
In 1960 nine states required payment of a jury fee by the unsuccessful party after trial.5 6 1d. at 49 1-92 (1960). The Judicial Conference Committee on the Operations of the
Jury System explicitly rejected the proposal to charge the jury costs to the litigants:
The countervailing considerations [to such a proposal], however, are so
strong as to make this step undesirable even if it would result in a saving of
money.
The courts should be open and free to everyone and no special charge
should be imposed on persons who prefer one form of trial as against
another. The right to use the courts is a basic part of the rights of every
citizen, and constitutes a part of the service that the Government furnishes to
all citizens and, therefore, the expense involved should be borne out of the
general fund of the Treasury. Id.
57 Summers, Some Merits of Civil Jury Trials, 39 TUL. L. REV. 3, 8-9 (1964).
5 8 See Wiehl, supra note 35; Tamm, supra note 35; Tamm,A Proposal for Five-Member
Civil Juries in the Federal Courts, 50 A.B.A.J. 162 (1964).
59 See note 7 supra.60 Tamm, supra note 35, at 13 1-32.
61 Id. Judge Tamm notes that his experience indicates that lawyers use the same critical
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seems that significant time would be saved in the voir dire through
use of a smaller jury.6 2 When the consideration is savings of time,
it is important to note that although a large number of cases do
not go through to a veFdict (the parties settling out of court), most
cases usually do proceed to voir dire, and, therefore, time savings
during voir dire would be important.6 3
Second, some time might be saved during the actual trial.
Exhibits which are often passed from juror to juror for exam-
ination would require less time to be examined by, say, six jurors
than by twelve, assuming the average amount of examination time
by each juror remains constant. 64 In addition, because certain
objections can be made and argued only when the jury is absent
from the courtroom, less time should be needed for jury exits and
re-entries of the courtroom when the number of persons involved
is reduced.6 5
Although generally unsupported by statistical evidence, some
writers suggest that time would be saved in reaching the verdict 66
because, barring the unlikely situation in which the jury reaches
agreement on the first ballot, most of the jury's deliberation -time
is spent in trying to convince holders of a minority opinion to
accept the opinion of the majority.6 7 Thus, by reducing the size of
the panel, the number of jurors holding a minority opinion should
be proportionately reduced, and since less time should be neces-
sary to convince a small minority than a large minority, a con-
sensus will be reached more quickly. 8
Finally, time should be saved in the process of polling the jury
after the verdict has been returned. While the actual amount of
time saved in polling, or in any other individual jury function, may
be comparatively negligible in 'relation to the total length of the
trial, when all functions are considered in the aggregate, the time
standard for acceptance of a juror in all cases, and in states which have adopted smaller
juries, the criticism has not been shown to exist.
62 This problem has prompted the suggestion that the judge should conduct the voir dire
in all cases to insure a fair selection of jurors within a reasonable amount of time.
Comment, Abolition of the Civil Jury: Proposed Alternatives, supra note 4, at 424. See
also note 52 supra.
63 Phillips, A Jury of Six in All Cases, 30 CONN. BAR J. 354, 356 (1956).
64 Id. at 356; Tamm, supra note 35, at 132.
6 Phillips, supra note 63, at 357.
6 Id. at 357.
67 See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 50, at 488- 89.
68 However, one experiment in group psychology revealed that once a majority of three
is attained, majority pressure on minority holdouts remains constant despite increases in
the size of the majority. This experiment would suggest that a smaller jury does not
necessarily save time in reaching a consensus. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the
Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in G. SWANSON, T. NEWCOMB, & E. HART-
LEY, READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (rev. ed. 1952).
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savings and resulting increase in efficiency are significant. In the
few judicial experiments involving small juries,69 the results have
been favorable: small jury trials have proceeded at a faster pace
and helped reduce the backlog of cases. 70
The second aspect of jury inefficiency is the economic costs of
the present system. Although certain absolute costs are inherent
in the system71 and cannot be eliminated without eliminating the
entire structure, other costs can clearly be reduced through reduc-
tion of the number of jurors. The direct jury costs in the federal
court system amounted to almost four million dollars in 1960,72
more than half being paid as per diem expenses to the jurors. If
the number of jurors receiving the per diem allotments were
reduced, the allotments would, of course, be decreased propor-
tionately. 73 Reductions in court costs would result from the de-
crease in time needed to conduct the trial and savings derived
69 Judge Herndon quotes approval of the reduced jury sizes from jurists in Utah (the
Chief Justice), Florida (the Chief Justice) and Virginia (Executive Secretary to the Chief
Justice). Herndon, The Jury Trial in the Twentieth Century, 32 L. A. BULL. 35, 47-50
(1956). For a list of all states having statutory provisions for juries of less than twelve in
certain courts see Tamm, supra note 35, at 135-36.
70 Reports from an experiment with six man civil juries in the district court of Worces-
ter,-Massachusetts. 42 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 136 (No. 4, 1958). The experiment was ini-
tiated on July 1, 1957, and within a year had significantly reduced the case load of the
Superior Court. The clerk also reported that verdicts had been no different from those
returned by a twelve man jury. Id. Note that lawyers had taken full advantage of the
expedience afforded by the innovations, and had not attempted to bypass the smaller juries
in favor of Massachusett's provisions for a twelve man panel. Furthermore, there had been
no decrease in the number of cases tried without a jury. This undermined a major criticism
by the opponents that the trial calendars would be filled by parties who did not want the
expense of a twelve man jury, but were willing to accept a six man jury rather than have
their cases tried by a judge alone.
The success of the Worcester experiment prompted some jurists to suggest that the six
man jury be extended to certain criminal cases; especially those involving driving while
under the influence of alcohol, which were being tried extensively by twelve man juries
due to the harshness of the mandatory penalty imposed on the guilty. Cronin, Six-Member
Juries in District Courts, 2 BOSTON BAR J. 27 (April _1958).
71 Clearly there are some costs which will exist so long as the jury system is maintained.
These include the costs of juror selection and expenses paid to bailiffs and deputies.
72 A breakdown of the 1960 jury costs is as follows:
Per D iem ........................................................................... $2,475,000
Subsistence ......................................................................... 200,000
M ileage .............................................................................. 1,160 ,000
$3,835,000
M eals and Lodgings ............................................................... 63,500
Fees of Jury Commissioners ...................................................... 9,500
Travel and other (jury view) ...................................................... 4,000
$3,912,000
Excluding the $9,500 paid to jury commissioners, the remaining total of $3,902,000 is
divided between $3,214,000 (85 percent) paid to petit jurors and $588,500 (15 percent)
paid to grand jurors. THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE
JURY SYSTEM, REPORT ON THE JURY SYSTEM IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 26 F.R.D. 409,
487 (1960).
7 Similar savings would result from reductions in allotments paid directly to the ju-
rors-mileage, meals, travel, etc.
FALL 197 1] Reducing the Size of Juries
from reduction of the amount of work for clerks and marshals.
One authority suggests that reducing the number of jurors to six
would result in at least a one-third savings of public funds. 74
Smaller juries would also significantly reduce the indirect costs
borne by society, such as time losses in working hours for both
employees and employers. 75
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS OF REDUCING
THE SIZE OF SMALL GROUPS
Although reduced jury size is clearly advantageous in terms of
efficiency, questions remain about the effect of smaller size on the
dynamics and quality of jury decisions. Despite the fact that a
relatively large number of states and municipalities have instituted
some form of reduced juries, 76 very little statistical analysis has
74 Wiehl, supra note 35, at 40. One Connecticut judge estimated that a six man jury
would save the state $75,000 per year. Phillips, supra note 63, at 357.
75 Judge Littlejohn analyzed the work load and resulting expense of a typical work week
using twelve jurors in his South Carolina circuit court. During a five day week, thirty-six
jurors lost $50 each by virtue of lost working hours. Additional losses were incurred by
their employers as a result of their absence. The county paid the jurors $1440 to dispose of
three cases, an amount which could.be cut in half by instituting a reduced jury with "no
less justice than the twelve-man jury brings into being." Littlejohn, supra note 54, at 15.
Although litigants often bear a share of the jury expenses, much of the burden, either
directly or indirectly, falls on the county or state. Herndon, supra note 69 at 53. To this
extent, the taxpayer, not the litigant, bears the burden of the expense ofjury trial.
Judge Littlejohn stated: "The litigant no matter how meritorious or spurious his claim,
pays little towards the over-all cost of operating the court. Sometimes the court expenses
exceed the prayer for relief in the complaint, and even more often the cost of operating the
court exceeds the amount to which the claimant is entitled." Littlejohn, supra note 54, at
15.
Although all jury costs could be assessed to litigants, the prospect of increasing the
already exorbitant costs of litigation is hardly an appealing alternative. It would seem more
appropriate to reduce the expense of jury trials by modifying the system rather than
redistributing the cost burden.
A number of states have required pre-payment of the jury fees by the party demanding a
jury trial. THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY
SYSTEM, REPORT ON THE JURY SYSTEM IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 26 F.R.D. 409, 539
(1960). Note that the pre-paid fees range from $3 to a high of $72 per diem compensation
for the jurors.
The Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System rejected the
idea that costs should be reduced by placing a greater burden on the litigants since such a
provision was contrary to the basic theory of the Magna Carta. See note 56 supra.
76 Judge Herndon reported in 1956 that at least thirty-six states had made statutory
provisions for juries of less than twelve in some of their courts. Herndon, supra note 69, at
47.
Furthermore, in recent months the United States District Courts for Minnesota, New
Mexico, Southern Illinois, Southern Florida, and Indiana have reduced the size of civil
juries to six members. N.Y. Times, March 17, 1971, at 32, col. 7. Chief Justice Burger
reported that the Judicial Conference for the United States had voted to reduce the size
of federal civil juries to a number less than twelve. Criminal juries were not covered by the
announcement, but recent discussions of the criminal branch indicate that a similar change
may be forthcoming. Id. at 1, col. I.
Beginning June 1, 1971, six member juries will try all civil cases in the U.S. District
Court for Kansas, although criminal trials will maintain twelve man juries. N.Y. Times,
March 21, 1971, at 58, col. 2.
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been forthcoming. 77 Social psychologists engaged in analysis of
small group decision-making, however, have accumulated a limit-
ed amount of data which appears applicable to examinations of
jury size. Although critics of the use of psychological studies
argue that there are special characteristics of a jury (such as the
participants' awareness of their status as jurors, the experience of
watching the problem unfold in a courtroom, and the importance
of their verdict) which cannot be reproduced in an experimental
situation, 78 a comparison of the results of actual jury analysis with
analysis of carefully controlled experimental groups does not sup-
port this criticism. 79 There is therefore no reason to believe that
the dynamics of the deliberative process of decision-making in
small group experiments should differ from the same process
occurring in a jury room. While a completely accurate analysis of
a jury's time spent in deliberation would require a precise replica-
tion of the same trial using varying numbers of jurors,80 a study of
77 While many judges, lawyers and clerks say that the modifications have proved
satisfactory and should be continued, the concrete data to support their opinions are
lacking. See note 70 supra. See also Wiehl, supra note 35, at 41 ; Tamm, supra note 58, at
165.
78 The difference between civil and criminal trials may become important in analogizing
to experimental data. While a jury's task in a civil trial may be generally viewed as a
question of whether there is a cause of action and if so, the amount of damages to be
awarded, the task in a criminal trial is to determine guilt and thereby directly influence the
defendant's future rights and privileges. The suggestion has been made that the jury in a
civil trial may consider its task relatively academic, whereas the responsibility for deter-
mining the future of a defendant's life may weigh heavily upon the collective conscience of
the jury. This deeper sense of responsibility could not be replicated in an experimental
situation unless the subjects actually believed that they were trying a defendant.
Although there is no data to support the contention that the deliberative processes may
differ with civil and criminal juries, and that the experimental situation is analogous only to
the civil jury, the Williams court recognized that some state legislatures might decide that
"it is desirable to spread the collective responsibility for the determination of guilt among
the larger group." 399 U.S. at 103.
For purposes of discussing the dynamics of small group decision-making, the distinction
seems speculative at best, and civil and criminal juries will be considered jointly.
79 Compare the results of the Chicago jury study (H. KALVEN, supra note 50) and other
studies of jury composition (see Holbrook, Composition of Juries as a Group, in C.
JOINER, supra note 48) with the experimental results of Strodtbeck (Strodtbeck James, &
Hawkins, Social Status in Jury Deliberations, 22 AM. Soc. REV. 713 (Dec. 1957).
Nevertheless, in order to make a constructive use of social psychological experimental
data to study the jury system, certain characteristics of the control groups must be similar
in nature to jury situations. For example, certain problems given to an experimental group
for consideration would require different capabilities of the group memlbers than would be
required by a typical jury to reach a verdict. Also, the composition of some experimental
groups may be so unlike the composition of a jury that an analysis of the former would not
prove valuable to a study of the latter. With these caveats in mind, a review of the
literature should be instructive in determining how small groups differ from larger groups.
80 This, of course, would be virtually impossible, because precisely the same case would
be unlikely to arise in two jurisdictions-one of which used twelve jurors and the other
using fewer. Even if it did, the participants would be different, and therefore no accurate
comparison could be made. There would be value, however, in comparing the average
amount of time for a case to be tried before and after a particular jurisdiction changed from
twelve jurors to a lower number. Data of this type are lacking. See Strodtbeck, Social
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psychological experiments using different-sized groups to solve
the same problem presents a fair analogy to the jury situation. In
one experiment, groups of 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18,
and 20 were used to play a game of "Twenty Questions" 8' in
which each group had to discuss the proper questions to be used
before actually propounding them. 2 The experiment revealed that
the larger groups took longer to reach decisions, and the larger the
group's size, the more reluctant were members to express their
opinions. Similarly, another study of groups composed of from
five to twelve members revealed that the larger groups con-
sistently required more time to reach a decision.83
With respect to the- quality of deliberation of smaller juries,
critics have contended that there would be less stimulation of
profitable discussion and the jury would be more easily dominated
by a strong and aggressive member.8 4 Professor Strodtbeck,
working in conjunction with the Chicago jury study, examined the
deliberations of twelve man groups that were set up as ex-
perimental reproductions of actual juries.85 The groups listened to
a recorded trial and were allowed: to retire and reach a verdict
while their deliberations were recorded. Results of the study
showed that in 82 percent of the "juries," the three most domi-
nant participants accounted for one-half or more of the total
communications.8 6 Thus it appears from these studies that in
Process, the Law, and Jury Functioning, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 144, 149 (W. Evan ed.
1962) for a discussion of experimental replication.
81 N. Miller, The Effect of Group Size on Decision-Making Discussions, 1951 (unpub-
lished Ph.D. Dissertation in University of Michigan Graduate Library). "Twenty Ques-
tions" is a common parlor game in which one person has in mind a physical object and the
others are required to ascertain what the object is. The questioners may ask only twenty
questions answerable by a simple "yes" or "no" in their discovery process.
82 The deliberative process required was analagous to a jury's task in several ways.
Since the number of questions was limited, group discussion and agreement was required
to decide which question would be asked. Opinions of all members had to be solicited and
final approval may have been reached by a voting process. Presumably, if the group was
divided on a decision, the majority would attempt to pursuade the minority to its point of
view. Finally, once the question was agreed upon, only one member could present it to the
experimenter, the leader being roughly analogous to a jury foreman.
83 Hare, A Study of Interaction and Concensus in Different Sized Groups, 17 AM. Soc.
REV. 261 (June 1952). The experiment used small groups of Boy Scouts who were
presented with a problem involving a "camping game." They were required to reach a
group decision on the best solution. There is no indication that the results achieved by
using Boy Scouts differed significantly from use of adults.
84 Letter of August, 1970 from Dean Francis A. Allen, University of Michigan Law
School, to the Journal of Law Reform.
85 Strodtbeck, James, & Hawkins, Social Status in Jury Deliberations, 22 AM. Soc.
REV. 713 (Dec. 1957). This study is one of the few in which the experimental groups were
created with the intent of reproducing a jury situation. The participants were chosen from
regular jury pools. They listened to a recorded trial and were told they were to reach a
verdict just as if they had been the jurors in the case. Bailiffs of the court were present to
enhance the realism of the situation.
86 Id. at 715.
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juries of twelve members, most of the discussion is carried on by
a very limited number of the jurors.
In one of the studies comparing the deliberations of large and
small groups, it was revealed that there were more opportunities
to talk in the smaller groups, whereas in the larger groups there
was a wider divergence in the amount of participation among the
members. 87 As the high participators spoke more, there was less
opportunity. for a low participant to discuss his views, and he
therefore felt less pressure from the other members to partici-
pate.8 8 The researcher hypothesized that in larger groups the high
participators were attempting to overcome the feelings of frustra-
tion created by the diminished opportunity to talk, while the
number of low participators increased as the pressure to speak
decreased. 89 Another experimenter discovered similar results, but
attributed the decrease in participation by most of the group
members to their self-conscious feelings that their opinions were
not so important to the group when there were more members.90
Analogous results were also discovered by Professor Bales (a
leader in small group studies) who, in experimenting with groups
of sizes two to seven found that as group size increased, the
number of persons who participated at absolutely minimal rates
increased. 91 Bales attributed this result to the fact that larger
groups afforded shy or tense persons a greater amount of anonym-
ity which permitted them to avoid discussion.
These studies would appear to support the view that discussion
is stimulated by reducing the size of the group, since group
members are less likely to consider the other members as an
audience when they participate with fewer people. While the
critics believe that reducing the size of a jury will limit the con-
structive participation of a wide variety of members of contrasting
backgrounds representing the "community conscience," studies
87 See Miller, note 81 supra.
88 Id. at 45.
89 Id.
90 See Hare, note 83 supra.
91 Bales and Borgatta, Size of Group as a Factor in the Interaction Profile, in SMALL
GROUPS 495 (A. Hare, E. Borgatta & R. Bales eds. 1965). The experiment involved an
application of Bales' interaction process and analysis to group discussion of a complex
human relations problem. Essentially the interaction process and analysis involves a
running log of all overt actions by all members of the group. These are then categorized
into twelve groups which Bales claims represent most interpersonal actions occurring
during the problem-solving process. The human relations problems used in the study bore
some resemblance to the types of problems a jury faces. After the experimenter recited the
facts of the "case," the group members were asked to recommend the most desirable
action to be taken to resolve the problem.
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indicate that in fact the larger groups -tend to inhibit discussion,
and more active participation by all members is achieved as a
result of the reduction.
Another aspect of the deliberation process which merits in-
vestigation is the relative influence of the more active members on
the group decision. A possible drawback of the smaller jury is that
an active participator would have fewer members to convince,
thus increasing the likelihood that the more aggressive member
could impose his opinion on the group. One experiment tends to
support this charge, since the analyst found that leaders in small
groups have more influence on the final decision than leaders of
large groups.9 2 While no studies have directly refuted this study's
findings, the impact may be weakened by results of Strodtbeck's
experiment. He found that the more active members of his twelve
man "juries" were almost always able to persuade less active ones
to their point of view. Therefore, while the critics of smaller juries
may be correct in theorizing that an active member is more likely
to have a greater influence on the group deliberations, the deci-
sion-making process in either a twelve man jury or a reduced jury
is essentially the same: the more active members almost always
have ultimate influence in determining the final verdict.93
A final consideration of the deliberative process is the quality
of the discussion and utlimate decision. Professor Fox conducted
an experiment with different sized groups of United States Air
Force officers in which the groups were given a complex human
relations problem to solve.94 In rating the solution's quality, Fox
concluded that "in a 50-minute period a large ad hoc staff of
12- 13 officers was able to organize and establish channels of
communication to produce a written group product superior in
quality to those produced by small staffs of 6-8 officers in the
same length of time."9 5 However, Professor Thomas, in reviewing
92 Hare, supra note 83, at 265.
93 The question then becomes whether the nature of the reduced jury would change the
nature of the group of potential jurors who are most active. That is, since the low
participators tend to increase the amount of their participation as the size of the group is
reduced, they may begin to replace the high participators and subsequently deprive them
of their influence. Thus, a juror who would be a low participator in a twelve man jury,
might become a high participator in a reduced jury with a consequent increase in influence.
Therefore, the ultimate verdict might differ when the size of the jury is reduced, the
difference representing the increased influence of a group of jurors which was previously
powerless. No difference is assured, however, and precisely the same verdict might be
reached even after a realignment of high participators.
94 Fox, Lorge, Weltz, & Herrold, Comparison of Decisions Written by Large and Small
Groups, 8 THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 351 (August, 1953).
95 Id. at 351.
FALL 1971l]
Journal of Law Reform
experiments regarding group size, noted that studies of quality of
group decisions have rendered mixed reports:96
Considering the group performance findings as a whole, it
appears that both quality of performance and group produc-
tivity were positively correlated with group size under some
conditions, and under no conditions were smaller groups su-
perior. In contrast, measures of speed showed no difference
or else favored the smaller groups. 9 7
The quality of jury deliberations, of course, is highly subjective
in nature and not conducive to analysis. In some of the ex-
periments which Thomas reviewed, the group problem involved
finding a solution to a riddle or problem of logic.98 Solutions of
this type of problem can be easily rated as right or wrong, yet the
problems upon which jurors deliberate are seldom of this nature
since juries deal with problems which can be solved only by
judging the credibility of witnesses and weight of the evidence. To
this extent, the experiments dealing with the quality of group
decisions are probably not applicable to an analysis of jury ver-
dicts. A more accurate measure might be made by comparing the
jury verdicts to a decision by the presiding judge, or by comparing
the verdicts of small juries to those of larger juries hearing the
same case. 99 Since no such experiments have yet been carried
out, at present the conclusions regarding the quality of decisions
are highly tenuous.
A third area of experimentation has been conducted in regard
to the satisfaction of the jury members with the group experience.
Satisfaction of the jury members is an important factor in commu-
nity acceptance of the judicial system. 100 In his experimental jury
96 Thomas and Fink, Effects of Group Size, in SMALL GROUPS 495 (A. Hare, E.
Borgatta & R. Bales eds. 1965).
97 Id. at 527.
98 Id. at 534-36.
9 A comparison of the verdicts of small juries to those of larger juries hearing the same
case might show some divergence. See notes 39 and 93 supra. The quality of the differing
verdicts, however, is unclear. If the increased influence of formerly powerless jury mem-
bers may be viewed as enhancing the "cross section of the community" aspect of a jury,
then perhaps the verdict would be more representative regardless of quality. On the other
hand, some critics may contend that the high quality of verdicts rendered by twelve man
juries is attributable to the highly influential professional persons (see text accompanying
note 106 infra.) who are generally more highly educated than clerks, laborers, or skilled
workers. This criticism, of course, erodes the concept of trial by one's peers.
100 Dean Joine" has discussed the consequences of lack of public acceptance by the
community: "The law requires community-wide acceptance. If the community as a whole
did not accept law, people would be very unhappy. There could be widespread disregard
for or even revolt against the government that created the law." C. JOINER, supra note 48,
at 37.
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studies, Strodtbeck found that the level of an individual's satisfac-
tion with the verdict was positively correlated with the level of his
own participation. 10 1 Since the number of persons participating at
absolutely minimal levels increases as the size of a group in-
creases, the satisfaction of the group as a whole should increase
as the group is reduced in size. One social scientist, noting a
strong tendency for larger groups to divide into cliques, attributed
the result to the juror's attempt to search out and associate with
other jurors most similar to himself. He concluded:
If members feel frustrated about their lack of participation, it
is quite possible that they will begin communicating with
people sitting near them in the group (if they can't talk to the
whole group, they will whisper to neighbors), and/or give tacit
support to those people who do express their unexpressed
ideas102
If members of larger groups are more likely to become frustrated
and dissolve into smaller cliques which are not conducive to
group deliberation and are more likely to promote competition
and disagreement among the members, member satisfaction with
the deliberative process must decrease. Moreover, if strong com-
petition develops among the cliques regarding the final verdict, a
compromise verdict may have to be rendered which is wholly
satisfactory to none.
Finally, in Williams the Supreme Court suggested that, in terms
of the cross section of the community represented, the differences
between a six man and a twelve man jury seemed negligible.' 03
Empirical studies of the composition of juries indicate that in fact
juries seldom represent a true cross section 0 4 and are most often
overrepresented by housewives 0 5 and persons with some college
background. In addition, Strodtbeck found that the opinions of
Public acceptance may be attributed in part to the satisfaction derived from serving on
juries, but in a larger sense the public seems to believe that their peers are better able to
understand the human elements involved in a case. Both litigants and jurors are more
likely to accept a jury verdict than an administrative opinion. In order that public accep-
tance of the judicial system continue, it is crucial that the system be supported by public
opinion, and without such support, social dissatisfaction and disregard of the judiciary will
be fostered. C. JOINER, supra note 48, at 65. In the Ford Foundation study at the
University of Chicago Law School, 94 percent of the jurors polled responded that they
would like to serve again. Only 3 percent said they would not like to serve again. The
Chicago jury study indicated that 70 percent of the public favored jury trial and only 9
percent favored trial by judges. Summers, supra note 57, at 8.
101 Strodtbeck, supra note 85, at 716.
102 Miller, supra note 81 at- 12- 13. See also Hare, supra note 83, at 266- 67.
103 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
104 Holbrook, Composition of Juries as a Group, in C. JOINER, supra note 48 at 195.
105 Forty-one percent of the jurors in this study were housewives. Id. at 200.
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professional persons were more influential in reaching a verdict
than the opinions of skilled workers, clerical employees or labor-
ers.'0 6 These findings indicate that rarely is an accused truly
judged by a panel of his peers, nor does the panel presently
represent a cross section of the community. Therefore, a reduc-
tion in the size of the jury would not necessarily have an adverse
effect on the "community conscience" aspect of the jury's func-
tion.
Nevertheless, an important problem is highlighted: under-
represented minority groups are even less likely to be included on
a smaller jury. 10 7 Although the problem can be rectified in part
through the voir dire process, it suggests that the courts must
become increasingly alert to the problem of minority representa-
tion among potential jurors.108
V. CONCLUSION
As trials are delayed for extended periods of time and the costs
of the judicial process become increasingly burdensome, reform of
the jury system is imperative. Reduction of jury size would elim-
inate many problems while retaining the fundamental benefits of
the jury trial.109 Specifically, juries of less than twelve will not
significantly affect the deliberative quality of the jury system nor
undermine the jury's function as the conscience of the commu-
nity. Most judges and lawyers who have dealt with smaller juries
106 Strodtbeck, supra note 85, at 716.
107 See Comment, Florida's Six-Member Criminal Juries: Constitutional, But are They
Fair?, supra note 32, at 408:
Based on voter registration figures for Florida ... one of every nine potential
jurors is black. Computing probability from that ratio, a defendant in Florida
has less than a fifty percent chance of trial by a six-member jury that includes
a black person .... Expanding the jury to twelve members would more than
double the likelihood of a black juror ....
Furthermore, the general composition of the twelve man jury is likely to change. That is,
while a male professional (who tends to be a dominant figure in jury decision-making, see
text accompanying note 106 supra) may often be included in a twelve man jury, the
chances of his inclusion on a smaller jury are reduced. Such a change in the composition
may promote a different verdict (see note 93 supra), yet the nature of the difference is
unclear, and in view of the other parameters which would change, there is no certainty of
any difference whatsoever.
108 The solution to this problem is not to be found through maintaining a twelve man
jury or even through increasing the size of the jury. The problem does suggest, however,
that other means of increasing minority representation should be investigated.
109 C. JOINER, supra note 48, at 31. Not only do the smaller juries retain the advantages
of the larger juries, but in many cases the modifications enhance the value of the system.
Smaller groups are likely to be more cohesive, they spend less time on a single problem
than do larger juries, and the participating jurors have a more favorable impression of the
judicial system.
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have been satisfied with the verdicts, 110 and the empirical data
available indicate that the verdicts returned by small juries have
not been significantly different from those rendered by twelve man
juries."'
While a search for the ideal reduced jury size may seem elu-
sive, 112 available experimental data suggest that an odd number" 3
greater than three 1 4 is required. Nevertheless, the jury size
should be the lowest number consistent with the effective func-
tioning of the panel." 5 Although several methods of implementing
the proposal have been offered,"16 the most expedient alternative
is through legislation mandating use of the small jury in all cases
tried by jury.117 States which have introduced the modification in
110 Wiehl, supra note 35, at 41. Tamm, supra note 58, at 165. Judge Tamm reported a
favorable experience with five man juries in the District of Columbia.
111 42 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y, supra note 70. Based upon a report of the clerk for the
District Court of Worcester, Massachusetts.
112 Judge Tamm has proposed a five man jury. Tamm, supra note 35, at 136. Judge
Wiehl was most satisfied with the number six. Wiehl, supra note 35. States which have
implemented a mandatory jury of less than twelve in civil cases have used juries of six,
seven and eight. Tamm, supra note 35, n. 60 at 135. Since no reasons are offered for the
choice of any specific number, one may deduce that the selection is arbitrary.
113 Bales, in experiments with groups ranging in size from two to seven members, found
that the two man groups stifled discussion, because the members sought to avoid direct
confrontation, and aigumentation. Generally, groups with an even number of members
were higher in "showing disagreement" and "antagonism," and split evenly without a
majority. Thus even-numbered groups may persist in a deadlock, whereas odd-numbered
groups are more conducive to majority pressures, and so arrive at a decision sooner. Bales
& Borgatta, supra note 9 1, at 503, 509.
114 Bales found three man groups to be peculiarly unstable: if two members disagreed,
the third had a great deal of power to side with one or the other. He concluded that this
situation breeds a "power politics" approach which is not conducive to substantive
deliberations. Id. at 509.
115 Tamm, supra note 35, at 136.
116 In the federal system, rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and rule 23(b)
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure permit juries of less than twelve upon stipulation of the
parties. "The parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than
twelve .... FED. R. Civ. P. 48 "Juries shall be of 12 but at any time before verdict the
parties may stipulate in writing with approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any
number less than 12." FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b). State procedures generally either follow the
federal example [see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.44.120 (1956): The jury shall
consist of twelve persons, unless the parties consent to a less number. The parties may
consent to any number not less than three .. .] or make the smaller juries mandatory [see
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600,1352 (1970), supra note 7] or establish the smaller juries
by statute, but allow increase in size upon payment of a special jury fee [see, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. 78-7-4 (1963), "The jury shall consist of six persons, unless the parties
agree to a smaller number, not less than three. Any party may have the right to increase
the number of jurors to twelve by depositing with the clerk an additional jury fee .... ]
117 The federal approach has proved ineffective as a means of instituting smaller juries.
Judge Tamm reported that in his fourteen years on the bench, no case was tried before him
in which the parties voluntarily stipulated to a jury of less than twelve. Tamm, supra note
35, at 140. Judge Phillips reported that after three years of operating under the Con-
necticut statute which provided for election of larger jury on payment of a fee, most of the
six man juries were used in the Common Pleas Court, while in the Superior Court-where
most of the delay existed -litigants continued to demand the larger juries. Phillips, supra
note 63, at 355.
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this manner have reported no public antagonism toward or dis-
satisfaction with the smaller jury. l l " Much evidence, therefore,
points to the conclusion that implementation of a smaller jury
would make a significant contribution to improving the American
system of justice.
-David M. Powell
118 Cronin, supra note 70, at 28-29. The general reaction to the proposal in those
jurisdictions which have fully instituted it is apparent from Judge Herndon's statement:
"So far as we have been able to ascertain, curtailment of the size of civil juries has
operated very successfully in the states where it has been tried." Herndon, supra note 69,
at 47.
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